Accumulating evidence indicates that environmental temperature substantially affects economic outcomes and violence, but the reasons for this linkage are not well understood. We systematically evaluate the effect of thermal stress on multiple dimensions of economic decisionmaking, judgment, and destructive behavior with 2,000 participants in Kenya and the US who were randomly assigned to different temperatures in a laboratory. We find that most dimensions of decision-making are unaffected by temperature. However, heat causes individuals to voluntarily destroy other participants' assets, with more pronounced effects during a period of heightened political conflict in Kenya.
Introduction
Scholars have long attempted to understand the role that climate plays in human societies (de Secondat and De Montesquieu, 1748; Huntington, 1922; Lee, 1962) , with a recent acceleration of findings enabled by improved data, computing, and statistical techniques (Carleton and Hsiang, 2016) . High temperatures are found to influence important societal outcomes, reducing economic productivity , international trade (Jones and Olken, 2010) , hours worked (Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014) , physical activity (Obradovich and Fowler, 2017) , law enforcement effort , and fertility (Barreca et al., 2015) , while increasing domestic migration (Bohra-Mishra et al., 2014) , energy use (Wenz et al., 2017) , political turnover (Obradovich, 2017) , suicides (Carleton, 2017; Baysan et al., 2018) , HIV transmission , interpersonal violence (Ranson, 2014) , and intergroup conflict (Hsiang et al., 2013) .
A key remaining challenge is identifying the mechanisms through which high temperatures affect this array of human outcomes (Dell et al., 2014) . Two hypotheses are typically proposed, at least informally. First, it is possible that factors external to human beings respond to high temperature, which then directly or indirectly affect outcomes. For example, climate-induced loss of agricultural income (Schlenker and Roberts, 2009 ) has been proposed as a mechanism linking extreme climatic events with decisions to engage in political conflict (Miguel et al., 2004) , transactional sex , or suicide (Carleton, 2017) . Alternatively, extreme temperatures could directly influence the internal mental processes governing decision-making. In this vein, the medical and psychological literature has posited that heat increases aggression because of its negative effect on emotional affect (Bell and Baron, 1976) , because lowered affect is misattributed to anger (Zillmann, 2006) , or because of a physiological effect of heat that triggers aggression. In the economics literature, it has been suggested that violent crime and group conflicts become more likely at high temperatures because individual decision-making is altered-through diminished consideration for future consequences, lowered risk-aversion, or heightened risk of strategic miscalculation (Anderson, 1989; Baysan et al., 2018) . Determining the relative influence of external factors and internal mental processes is crucial to developing policies or technologies to address the damages caused by high temperatures.
Prior analyses established that cognitive performance, such as deciphering Morse code (Mackworth, 1946) and solving math problems (Graff Zivin et al., 2018) , declines at high temperature, and suggest that "aggressive" behaviors-such as sports violence (Larrick et al., 2011) , hornhonking (Kenrick and MacFarlane, 1986) , swearing on social media (Baylis et al., 2018) and aggression in the lab (Anderson, 1989 )-may increase. These prior analyses were narrow in scope, did not always rely on experimental variation, and could not isolate mechanisms.
We conduct the first systematic laboratory evaluation of high temperature effects on the internal mental processes that govern economic decision-making, judgment and destructive behavior.
We randomly assign subjects to Hot or Control environments in two parallel and simultaneous experiments conducted in Berkeley, California and in Nairobi, Kenya. We deploy a battery of assessments designed to measure: components of individual cognition, including precision (Gill and Prowse, 2012) , fluid intelligence (Penrose and Raven, 1936) , and reflection (Frederick, 2005) ; private preferences and decision-making quality, such as risk taking and rationality (Eckel and Grossman, 2008) , and patience and consistency of time preferences (Andreoni et al., 2015) ; social preferences and destructive behavior, including fairness (Cherry et al., 2005; Almås et al., 2010) , trust (Johnson and Mislin, 2011) , public goods provision (Fischbacher et al., 2001) , joy of destruction (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009) , charitableness (Andreoni, 2006) ; and individual affect, namely, happiness and alertness (Russell and Barrett, 1999) .
The experiments were run from September 2017 to February 2018. Notably, a controversial national election in Kenya occurred just prior to our experiment and was followed by months of heightened tensions between ethnic Luo (20.8% of Nairobi subjects) and Kikuyu (20.6%) communities, political turmoil, and violent protests (The Economist, 2017) that caused some experimental sessions to be rescheduled ( Supplementary Fig. D.8.2 ). This unplanned situation created a social context that seems to have influenced our findings in unanticipated but important ways, discussed below.
Research Design
The experiment was conducted in Berkeley, California, with N = 903 participants (Fig. 1B ) and in Nairobi, Kenya, with N = 1015 participants (Fig. 1D) . The experimental treatment consists of temperature manipulation: in both California and Nairobi, the target temperature in the control room is set to 22
• C, while the target temperature in the treatment room is set to 30
• C (Fig. 1A,C display actual temperatures). The experiment consists of experimental modules developed and validated in previous studies (Fig. 1E ). Participants are incentivized and play over tokens, where the conversion rate is 3.5 tokens to 1 Kenyan shilling in Nairobi and 2.1 tokens to 1 cent in California.
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Participants are drawn from the University of California, Berkeley for the California sample and the University of Nairobi for the Nairobi sample. 2 Although one should bear in mind that university students are not necessarily representative of the population as a whole (Sears, 1986) , the use of student subjects should not pose a problem for the study's external validity per se (Druckman and Kam, 2011) .
For each session, we aim to recruit 12 participants who are randomly assigned to either the control or treatment group (a session-condition).
3 At both sites, participants are randomly assigned to the treatment or the control room. To ensure sufficient exposure to treatment for all modules, participants at each location waited 20 minutes in the temperature-controlled laboratory rooms before beginning the experimental modules. During this time, they sat quietly at their seats and received instructions about the experiment. A water bottle, a notepad for writing, and a pen was placed at each participant's desk. Photos of the experimental set up are included in Supplementary Online Materials (SOM) Section D. The entire lab lasted for roughly one hour.
The experimental modules are by and large standard and well-known in the literature and allow us to measure the effect of temperature on a broad range of preferences, economic decisions and pro-social behavior. In the analyses below, we focus on a set of pre-specified outcomes that we term as "primary outcomes" of interest. We also note more "exploratory outcomes" of interest.
The Risk module elicits risk preferences using choices over lotteries (Eckel & Grossman, 2008) and presents two different menus of choices. The Time preferences module consists of the standard protocol for eliciting so-called "beta-delta" preferences, namely a convex time budget (CTB) design following Andreoni et al. (2015) . By detecting violations of the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference, both modules can identify the effect of temperature on the quality of decisionmaking. In addition, the Risk module can also reveal violations of first-order stochastic dominance.
The primary outcomes of interest from the Time preferences module include aggregate estimates of beta (time inconsistency) and delta (discounting). Exploratory outcomes of interest include an indicator for the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference violation, as well as individual rankings of choices from each menu. The primary outcomes of interest from the Risk module include the participant-chosen variance in outcome from the virtual coin toss featured in the first menu (where choosing a higher variance outcome is defined as being more risk-loving) as well as an indicator for a transitivity violation using both menus. An exploratory outcome of interest is an indicator for first-order stochastic dominance violation.
The Fairness module uses a real effort dictator game where participants first earn tokens from a Precision task (see Gill and Prowse (2012) and a short description below). Such earned income generates clear entitlements for the dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994) ,
where it is to be distributed among a pair of agents with identical earnings. 4 All participants act as dictators and know that their decision is implemented with fifty percent probability (Almås et al., 2010) . The primary outcome of interest is the share of the total initial amount of tokens that is allocated to the other participant.
The Public contribution module consists of a public goods game with three players, which 4 Hence the fair outcome given by entitlements is always an equal split.
encourages cooperation by doubling all contributions to a common pool (Fischbacher et al., 2001 ).
In the Trust module, one player in a pair is given an initial amount of tokens that can be sent to the other player. As in the public goods game, pro-social behavior is encouraged through a multiplier: any transfer sent is multiplied by three. The other player then decides to return any share of the amount received back to the first mover (including zero) (see Johnson and Mislin (2011) for a similar design). The primary outcome of interest from the Public contribution module is cooperation, defined as the amount of tokens placed into the group fund, while an exploratory outcome of interest is having correct beliefs (which is defined as an indicator variable for whether the individual guesses correctly about another's contribution). The primary outcome of interest from the Trust module is trust, defined as the share of the total initial amount that is sent to the other participant. An exploratory outcome of interest from the Trust module is trustworthiness, defined as the share of tokens sent back to the first participant. We also use the value coming from a 0 to 10 scale of trust in others' intentions as an exploratory outcome.
The Joy-of-destruction (JOD) game (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009 ) has been studied somewhat less. In this module, participants are informed that everyone has earned different amounts of (up to six) $1 Amazon gift cards in California or Airtime vouchers worth 50 Ksh each in Nairobi from a fluid intelligence task (described below). They are then anonymously matched in pairs and are told how much their partner has earned (X). Each participant can destroy any number of their assigned partner's vouchers between 0 and X. The computer can also destroy some of the remaining vouchers: it destroys nothing with probability 0.5, and any number of the remaining cards with equal probability. The other participant does not know whether her earnings are destroyed because of the computer or the participant's decision. Thus, a participant's purposeful destruction is partly concealed by the computer's random destruction. The game is conducted with gift cards (vouchers), so that actual destruction (and not reallocation) can take place. The primary outcome of interest is a measure of destruction, defined as the proportion of gift cards or vouchers destroyed.
In addition to the incentivized modules mentioned, we measure affect by including two questions: "On a scale from 1-7, with 1 being tired and 7 being alert, how do you feel right now?" 6 and "On a scale from 1-7, with 1 being sad and 7 being happy, how do you feel right now?". We also use a slider task to measure what we call precision (Gill and Prowse, 2012) , and measure fluid intelligence using Raven's matrices. The primary outcome of interest from the Precision task is the number of sliders correctly placed within three minutes, and the primary outcome in the Fluid intelligence task is the proportion of puzzles solved correctly. As part of the non-incentivized survey, we use a cognitive reflection test (CRT) consisting of five survey questions (Frederick, 2005) .
The primary outcome of interest from the CRT is the share of survey questions answered correctly.
The secondary outcome of interest is the time spent answering the questions. Finally, we include a demographic survey with questions on trust, body weight, and parental education and income.
Towards the end of the experimental session, after the participants are informed about their earnings, they can choose to donate some of their payments to a charity organization. The primary outcome from the Charitable donation module is the absolute amount they choose to donate.
The experimental design, protocol and core analyses were declared in advance and pre-registered on the American Economic Association RCT registry (available at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1361). All results from the pre-registered analysis are presented in the main text or the SOM. Additional post hoc analyses are explicitly identified below.
All statistical tests in this analysis are two-sided. For details about the design of each module as well as the exact timeline for the experiment and political setting at each site and the pre-analysis plan, please see the SOM.
Subjects were never deceived, and in order to incentivize truthfulness and effort, their performance and choices during the experiment determine their monetary earnings. In the social choice modules, individual rewards depend on interactions with other participants in the same room, anonymized and mediated through a computer terminal. The ordering of modules was fixed across treatments and sites (Fig. 1A,C) , although subjects in California generally completed tasks somewhat faster.
Nairobi and California were intentionally selected as experimental sites because the underlying population of university student subjects are distinct and might indicate whether or not the response to thermal stress differs across populations (Supplementary 
where i refers to individual, s refers to site, k refers to the module outcome (e.g., trust), Y i refers to an outcome of interest, T i is the treatment indicator for Heat, M ale is an indicator for the individual's self-reported gender being male, N airobi is a fixed effect for the experimental location being Nairobi, and ε i is an idiosyncratic error term. 6 Treatment effects in Fig. 2 are presented in terms of standard deviation units, normalized relative to participants in the Control condition. We cluster standard errors at the session level. Analysis was also carried out separately on the California and Nairobi subsamples.
To generate more meaningful inference, given the large number of hypotheses we consider, we carry out multiple hypothesis testing adjustments, a practice that is already carried out regularly in other fields such as genomics (Okbay et al., 2016; Hirschhorn and Daly, 2005) and increasingly in economics. In particular, we calculate false discovery rate adjusted "q-values" that limit the expected proportion of rejections within a set of hypotheses that are Type I errors, following Anderson (2008) . The use of q-values, which are interpreted analogously to p-values, was also specified in the pre-analysis plan. The use of both a pre-analysis plan that describes the primary hypothesis tests as well as multiple hypothesis testing adjustments should increase confidence in the results.
Results
We find that nearly all components of economic decision-making and judgment are largely unchanged by thermal stress (Fig. 2) , at the level of thermal exposure in our experiment. Further, we cannot reject that subjects in Nairobi and California respond similarly to temperature across nearly all outcomes. Specifically, we find no effect of high temperature on our measures of individual cognition, private preferences, decision-making quality, or pro-sociality. Across each of these outcomes, a null result is found in both the Nairobi (Fig. 2 in dark orange) and California (light green) samples, and pooled (black). In the precision task and fluid intelligence measures, individual estimates exhibit p-values < 0.05, but these effects are not statistically significant once we account for a pre-specified multiple hypothesis testing adjustment (q-values) .
In terms of magnitudes, the effect sizes themselves are also negligible. These are precisely estimated zeros. In other words, failure to detect significant impacts is not a consequence of small sample size; on the contrary, our study was powered at 80% to detect even modest impacts (of at least 0.2 of a standard deviation). Overall, we conclude that many fundamental elements of economic decision-making and judgment are broadly unaffected by thermal stress despite the large observed declines in self-reported alertness (all samples) and happiness (in Nairobi) (Fig. 22 ,
There is a statistically significant effect of thermal stress on destructive behavior in Nairobi, and this effect survives the multiple testing adjustment. Specifically, individuals choose to destroy more of the winnings of other players in the JOD module (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009 ) (q-value = 0.001). In Nairobi, subjects destroyed an additional 8 percentage points (0.30 s.d.) of other players' earnings in the Hot condition relative to Control -equivalent to an increase of almost 50%. In contrast, there is no increase in destructive behavior under thermal stress in the California sample.
In fact, destruction falls slightly among California subjects in the Hot treatment, by roughly half the magnitude of the Nairobi increase. We note that the average share of vouchers destroyed in California (6%, Fig. 3D ) is far lower than in Nairobi (18%, Fig 3A) .
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The strong aggressive response to heat in the Nairobi sample, and the absence of a similar response in the California sample, prompted us to investigate relevant mechanisms, including through analyses that were not pre-specified (see SOM) but that are guided by existing theoretical models of aggression. In particular, psychologists model aggression by means of a general affective aggressive framework, consisting of four stages/mechanisms (Anderson et al., 2000) : (i) initial inputs such as personal characteristics and situational variables, e.g., high temperature or aggressive cues; (ii) the impact of these initial inputs on a person's internal state, namely, emotional and physiological arousal, as well as cognition; (iii) appraisal of the situation either automatically or in a more controlled fashion through the lens of the internal state and choice of an appropriate response; and possibly (iv) manifestation of aggressive behavior.
The rich experimental and survey data we collect allows us to examine the extent to which some of these mechanisms operated in our lab setting. First, we find a significant negative impact of high temperature on both happiness and alertness in Nairobi, and on the latter in California.
In this regard, it is also interesting to reiterate that we find no direct effect of heat on cognitive 7 As noted in Bauer et al. (2018) , previous work using the joy of destruction game has documented destruction rates among university students ranging from 8 to 40% in the Netherlands (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009) 10 to 26% in Ukraine (Abbink and Herrmann, 2011) . Meanwhile, destruction rates ranged from 23 to 40% among pastoralists in Namibia, with higher levels of destruction among the resource-scarce subsample. Bauer et al. (2018) find destruction rates to be higher among adolescents from rural Uganda (53 to 59%) compared to adolescents from disadvantaged regions in Slovakia (32 to 42%). The differences in destruction rates across countries in this experiment is thus consistent with the available evidence.
performance. This suggests that, at least in our sample, heat may trigger aggression through its effect on affect and arousal rather than cognition.
Despite the absence of a direct effect on cognition, we find an interesting interaction between measures of cognitive ability and the aggressive response to the Heat condition: individuals in Nairobi with below median cognitive scores had a significantly larger (p = 0.020) destructive response to heat (12%) than those with above median cognitive scores (4%, Fig. 3C ). This suggests that cognitive ability may be an important mediator in the heat-aggression relationship, perhaps because it affects the extent to which "aggression-related thoughts, feelings and behaviour scripts" (Anderson et al., 2000) are accessed or how the situation is appraised. Parental university education (a correlate of socio-economic status), on the other hand, was unrelated to an individuals destructive response to thermal stress in both sites (Fig. 3B,E) . 8 Excitation transfer theory posits that arousal caused by an initial stimulus (here, heat) persists and "can be transferred and added to the arousal produced by a second stimulus" (Eysenick, 2004) , i.e., a provocation. Individuals may then (mis-)attribute their arousal exclusively to the second stimulus and respond excessively. More generally, excitation transfer theory suggests that negative arousal from several stimuli may combine and amplify responses, even if the underlying stimuli are different in nature (i.e., heat and provocation/frustration). The Kenyan sample provides a fortuitous testing ground for this conjecture. Kenyan national elections have been controversial in recent decades due to election fraud accusations and resulting ethnic violence (Mebane, 2017) . Our experiment occurred during a period of heightened instability immediately following the 8 August 2017 presidential election between Raila Odinga (a member of the Luo ethnic group) and the incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta (a member of the Kikuyu ethnic group; Fig. 5 ). Kenyatta won the general election, followed by an annulment of the results by the Supreme Court due to election discrepancies (September 1). Kenyatta won a second round of voting that was boycotted by the 8 A somewhat higher proportion of California lab participants correctly guessed that the purpose of the experiment was to assess the effect of thermal stress, compared to Kenya participants (see SOM Section F.3). However, there are no statistically significant differences in the effect of thermal stress on destructive behavior between those who did and did not figure out the purpose of the experiment (among the subset of our participants (n = 913) who received a debriefing questionnaire, see Online Appendix Table E.10.2). opposition (October 26) and generated accusations of voter intimidation and fraud. Violent clashes resulted, including in Nairobi, with many victims reported to be ethnic Luos supporting Odinga (The Economist, 2017; Kiruga, 2018) . This political context was salient during our study, as many experimental sessions in October were postponed because violence caused university closures (see SOM Sections B.1 and C.1 for details). No similar disruption occurred in Berkeley, California during the study.
Specifically, we hypothesize that the stronger aggressive response to heat seen in Nairobi is driven by the ongoing political marginalization and associated frustration of non-Kikuyu ethnic communities. Such a pattern would be consistent with the long-existing frustration-aggression literature, through which frustration leads to more aggressive behavior through negative affect (Berkowitz, 1989) , and would also be related to a recent finding that destruction increases with scarcity (Prediger et al., 2014) . Consistent with this, we find that Nairobi subjects that identify with an ethnicity other than Kikuyu (the ethnic group of the president re-elected just prior to the experiment) have a much larger increase in destructive behavior under thermal stress (Fig. 4B ).
Ethnic Kikuyu subjects exhibited no destruction response (Control = 14%, Hot = 12%). The largest response was visible in ethnic Luo subjects, where heat caused destructive behavior to more than double (12% vs. 27%), while other ethnic groups exhibited a response of intermediate magnitude. The difference between Luo and Kikuyu responses is statistically significant (p-value = 0.003). Among members of other ethnic groups, those predominantly politically aligned with the opposition show a response to high temperature that is somewhat larger than that found among members of largely pro-government ethnic groups, mirroring the pattern among ethnic Luo and Kikuyu participants (see Fig. 4C , and SOM Section F.7). Importantly, our results do not suggest that there is anything fundamentally different in the judgment or economic decision-making processes of Nairobi non-Kikuyu participants. The results for all other modules suggest that these subjects exhibit patterns of decision-making that are otherwise statistically indistinguishable from other subjects (see Online Appendix Section E.7); moreover, average rates of destruction in the Control condition are nearly identical across ethnic groups in Nairobi. We hypothesize that if Kikuyu or California subjects were politically marginalized similarly to the recent experience of ethnic Luos in Kenya, they would exhibit a JOD-temperature response similar to Luo participants.
Discussion
The finding that a politically disenfranchised population exhibits an increased preference for harming others under thermal stress might partially explain previous findings that higher temperatures elevate rates of interpersonal violence and social conflict around the world (Hsiang et al., 2013) .
However, the possible role of an internal mental channel does not preclude a simultaneous influence of external factors, such as altered economic circumstances (Miguel et al., 2004) , in generating human conflict via thermal stress.
Overall, our results indicate that, with the exception of destructive behavior, many basic elements of economic choices and decision-making quality are largely unchanged by thermal stress across populations on two continents facing different baseline climates. This suggests that some population-level effects of high temperatures, such as reduced economic productivity and labor supply (Graff Zivin and Neidell, 2014) , may be predominantly caused by changes to external factors, such as crop physiology (Schlenker and Roberts, 2009) or other non-cognitive components of the economy (Carleton and Hsiang, 2016) .
It is possible that different results may be achieved if subjects are exposed over longer a duration to temperatures higher than 30°C. The conditions of this study were constrained by ethical considerations. Further, the collection of biomarker data (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014) could shed light on physiological changes. It is also possible that other non-temperature stressors could similarly lead to increases in destructive and anti-social behavior among socially marginalized groups, and this remains a promising direction for future research.
Our ability to mitigate adverse human impacts of climate may depend on the underlying channels of impact. Traditional policy responses and technologies can effectively manage several exter-13 nal factors, but appear less suited to manage internal mental processes. Our findings on destruction suggest that interventions that dampen the economic consequences of thermal stress-such as expanded rainfall insurance-might not break the link between temperatures and human conflict if it is indeed mediated by internal mental processes. Especially in high-risk settings, other innovations that instead directly disincentivize destructive behavior or insulate individuals from high heat exposure, for instance, through air conditioning (Barreca et al., 2016) , may be necessary. (Penrose and Raven, 1936) Reasoning ability, measured through Raven's matrices c Cognitive reflection (Frederick, 2005) Ability to override gut response, measured through five questions Standard Economic d Risk-taking (Eckel and Grossman, 2008) Participant-chosen variance in outcome from a coin toss, where Preferences choosing a higher variance outcome is risk-loving d
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Social Preferences f Fairness (Almås et al., 2010) Share of tokens earned from precision task given freely to partner g Trust (Johnson and Mislin, 2011) Share of endowed tokens entrusted to partner, as a measure of trust h Public contribution (Fischbacher et al., 2001 ) Share of endowed tokens placed into the group fund, as a measure of willingness to contribute to a public good i Joy of Destruction (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009 ) Share of partner's vouchers or gift cards voluntarily and anonymously destroyed, as a measure of ill-will j Charitable donation (Andreoni, 2006) Amount of tokens donated to charity, as a measure of charitableness Emotions and Affect c Happiness (Russell and Barrett, 1999) Self-expressed degree of happiness at the end of the experiment c Alertness (Russell and Barrett, 1999) Self-expressed degree of alertness at the end of the experiment Figure 2: Treatment effects from the main specification in the pooled sample (black; N = 1, 878 participants), as well as from the Nairobi (dark orange; 1,004) and California (light green; 874) specifications (see SOM Section F for details) in Panel A. These tests were pre-specified in the pre-analysis plan. Treatment effects are presented in terms of standard deviation units for the 12 pre-specified primary outcomes of interest and for the survey questions on participant Happiness and Alertness. For comparability with regression results, individuals who did not respond "Female" or "Male" to the gender survey question were dropped (2% of the sample). Thin standard error bars correspond to the 95% confidence interval around the treatment effect off of the regression for the relevant specification, while thick standard error bars refer to those instances where the multiple testing adjusted False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-value significance level is less than 0.05. Multiple hypothesis testing adjustments are performed on the set of per comparison p-values associated with the treatment across pre-specified primary outcomes, for each specification. Multiple hypothesis testing adjustments are also performed on the set of p-values associated with the treatment for Happiness and Alertness (not pre-specified), for each specification. Panel B records the q-value associated with treatment across each outcome, by specification, where open triangles record q ≥ 0.05 and closed triangles record q < 0.05. The treatment effect for Time Inconsistency is flipped so that a positive treatment effect means more time inconsistency. To graphically display standardized treatment effects for Patience and Time Inconsistency, individual level estimates were developed via non-linear least squares, following Andreoni et al. (2015) . Individuals who responded solely with corner cases were dropped (8% of the sample) as well as those who exhibited GARP violations (4% of the sample) for the former calculations. Both individual level estimates for Patience and Time Inconsistency were bottom and top coded to be between 0 and 1 (inclusive) before standardization. Blue bars represent the average share of vouchers destroyed among individuals in the control group, while pink bars represent the average share of vouchers destroyed among individuals experiencing the heat treatment, in both the Nairobi sample (Panels A, B, and C) and the California sample (Panels D, E, and F). These sub-group tests were not pre-specified in the pre-analysis plan. Panels A and D provide site-specific average shares of destruction. Panels B and E provide site-specific average shares of destruction by parental university education status (an indicator variable set to one if the participant has at least one university educated parent). Panels C and F provide site-specific average shares of destruction by median "cognition score" status (where "cognition score" is developed by normalizing the sum of individuals' normalized results from the fluid intelligence task and cognitive reflection test). The standard error bars on the pink bars correspond to the 95% confidence interval around the treatment effect off of the main specification regression for the specific subsample. The overarching lines capture the p-value from the interaction effect (from the within-panel regression) between the specific group and treatment, where the leftmost group is the reference group. At the bottom of each panel is the number of individuals in that subsample. For comparability with regression results, individuals who did not respond "Female" or "Male" to the gender survey question were dropped (2% of the sample).
* p < .05, * * p < .01. C: Ethnicity-party Figure 4 : Treatment effects across self-reported ethnicities and ethnicity-party groups in the Joy of Destruction module in Nairobi. Treatment effects and standard errors are presented above the bars. Blue bars represent the average share of vouchers destroyed among individuals in the control group, while pink bars represent the average share of vouchers destroyed among individuals experiencing the heat treatment. These sub-group tests were not pre-specified in the pre-analysis plan. Panel A provides average shares of destruction in Nairobi. Panel B provides average shares of destruction by self-reported ethnicity in Nairobi. Panel C provides a similar breakdown as Panel B but splits other ethnicities into "other pro-opposition" or "other pro-government". "Other pro-opposition" refers to those individuals who self-identified with an ethnicity aligned with ethnic Luos, the ethnicity in opposition in the 2017 election, while "other pro-government" refers to those individuals who self-identified with an ethnicity aligned with ethnic Kikuyus, the ethnicity in power in the 2017 election. The standard error bars on the pink bars correspond to the 95% confidence interval around the treatment effect off of the main specification regression for the specific subsample. The overarching lines capture the p-value from the interaction effect (from the within-panel regression) between the specific group and treatment, where the leftmost group is the reference group. At the bottom of each panel is the number of individuals in that subsample. For comparability with regression results, individuals who did not respond "Female" or "Male" to the gender survey question were dropped (2% of the sample). * p < .05, * * p < .01. 
